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Article 2

CENSORING THE MOVIES
Two far extremes of opinions, which often clash in American public life, are represented today, in one part of that
shifting and never-quiet battlefield, by the "no-privacy"
zealots on one hand, and the "no-controls" party on the other.
Our role, in writing this paper, is not that of a referee splitting
the pugilists apart, or of an expert quoting odds on the outcome. We are merely taking a brief and non-prophetic spectator's look at a minor but not insignificant corner of the arena
wherein is being waged the set-to over censorship of motion
pictures.'
This argument was warmed up by the Supreme Court's
1952 decision2 invalidating New York State's ban on the
picture called "The Miracle." When that litigation reached
Washington, D. C., the stage was set, it was thought, for
a clear-cut answer to the question pressed on the court:
can any precensorship of films ever be constitutional? But,
as it turned out, a categorical answer was not forthcoming.
The Court did make official its 1948 dictum,3 or hint, that
moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included
within "the press," and so entitled to First (and Fourteenth)
Amendment protection.4 That, of course, was a flat and express reversal, by the Supreme Court, of so much of Mutual
Film Corp. v. IndustrialComm'n 5 as had announced that the
exhibition of moving pictures is a "business pure and simple,"
and that accordingly, films, of whatever kind, are not "part
1 Presently statewide censorship exists in seven states: Kansas, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Virginia. Besides this, there is
city or village censorship in about 60 municipalities in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin. According to newspaper reports, the Motion Picture Association of America has several times announced its intention to carry on, in the courts
and elsewhere, to abolish all forms of governmental censorship of motion pictures.
2 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
3 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
4 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
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of the press of the country." At least from this distance, the
nonsequitur is apparent, since the same test would have
denied to the New York Times a place "as part of the press
of the country."
However, we assume that the real reason why, in the
MutualFilm case, motion pictures were denied constitutional
rights to "press" freedom was because, usually they are not
vehicles of news or opinion, but mere shows or entertainments. As such, they were, or so it seemed in 1915, typical of
those public stage exhibitions traditionally (as in Britain
under the Lord Chamberlain) subject to the police power,
and entirely lacking in the purposes and public need which
characterizes the "press," and which have been thought to
mandate freedom of expression for journals of news and
opinion. Thus the Mutual Film decision itself seemed reasonable enough when it was announced. Most motion pictures
exhibited in American theatres were, or are, in the nature of
stage plays - tragedy, comedy, farce, musicals or whatnot.
They just simply are not vehicles or organs of opinion, have
none of the marks of the "press," and so lack its grounds for
demanding freedom from censorship. Of course, the Mutual
Film case, and others, 6 overlooked, or failed to give appropriate separate treatment to newsreels, which are similar to
newspapers, and so should have been judicially declared to be
part of the "press." But it was all or none in 1915 in Mutual
Film, and come 1952, it was all or none again in Burstyn,
when the Supreme Court covered all motion pictures under
the First Amendment's blanket of freedom.
But Burstyn did not in fact hold that the extension to films
of First Amendment protection automatically voided all prior
restraints thereof. Indeed, the Supreme Court was careful to
leave open the question as to whether a "clearly drawn statute
designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene films"
6

Pathe Exchange, Inc. v. Cobb, 236 N.Y. 539, 142 N.E. 274 (1915).
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would be unconstitutional.7 The Burstyn holdings are two:

8

first, that motion pictures are included in the First Amendment's "press"; and second, that for a variety of reasons, the
word "sacrilegious" in the New York motion picture censorship act 9 could not constitutionally serve as a standard for
denying a license for a film submitted to the New York
authorities. This same statute forbids the licensing not only
of "sacrilegious" films, but also those which are "obscene" or
"immoral," or "would tend to corrupt morals." On June 4,
1953, the New York Court of Appeals, in Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents,0 upheld the State Education
Department's denial of a license for the exhibition in New
York State of the French import "La Ronde," on the ground
that the picture was immoral and tended to corrupt morals.
To come to that conclusion, the Court of Appeals majority
had to hold, as in Burstyn, that state legislation imposing
previous restraints on the exhibition of motion pictures is not
necessarily and per se unconstitutional. 1 However, it is to be
noted that one of the dissenting judges stated his own belief
to the contrary. 2 '
Thus, the whole question of government control of obscene
or corrupting films is still at large, so far as the supreme
tribunal is concerned, and the question, in itself and in its
implications, is indeed a large one. The wide range of the
numerous opinions in the Burstyn and Commercial Pictures
cases is proof enough that such inquiries take us deep down
into root issues of public morality and public controls. Such
problems cannot be solved by the simple device of making
"censorship" a bad word, or by analogizing motion picture
censorship to the prohibition of alcohol, or by cartooning the
censor as a stovepipe-hatted nuisance poking his blue nose
7

8
9

10
11
12

Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952).
Id. at 502, 505.
N.Y. EDuc. LAW, § 122.

305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953).
Id. 113 N.E.2d at 503-5.
Id. 113 N.E.2d at 512-14.
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into other people's business and finding smut where none
exists. Facile writers follow current fashion, but detour
around logic and history when they deny to censorship any
place in democratic governmental processes, and describe all
censorship as repressive and tyrannical interference with
freedom to express ideas.
The idea that the First Amendment outlaws all prior restraints on any sort of publication simply does not stand up. 3
The First Amendment's purpose is plain enough. Its intent
was to forbid governmental interference, via previous restraints, with the putting forward of idea and opinions,
especially as to government and public officers.' 4 Whether
conventional or unconventional, orthodox or unorthodox,
popular or unpopular, such ideas were not to be denied expression, but were to be given their unhindered chance to
compete. But the First Amendment did not license, automatically and beyond control, any and every outpouring of
speech or pen, no matter how slanderous, blasphemous, obscene or seditious. Its purpose was to maintain and protect
public discussion, not to destroy public order. The First
Amendment did not abolish police power over utterances of
whatever sort. American legal history flatly denies the assertion that First Amendment freedoms leave government
powerless to prohibit publications which are obscene, or tend
to corrupt morals, or incite to vice or crime.' 5 Of course,
governmental activity as against such publications usually
takes the form of subsequent punishment rather than prior
13 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931) ; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919);
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
14 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713, 719 (1931). See Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
15 See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 513 (1948); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666-8 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-2 (1919);
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); People v. Most, 171 N.Y. 423, 431,
64 N.E. 175, 178 (1902). See also 2 COOLEY, CONsTITUTIONAL LrTATiONS 876 et
seq. (8th ed. 1927).
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restraint, but that seems to be rather a matter of method
than of principle.
Motion pictures, because of the ways of their production
and distribution, are well adapted to censorship. Preliminary
inspection, cutting, and licensing on higher governmental
levels, state-wide, is better than hit-or-miss local criminal
prosecution at the will of local police officers. Precensorship
of movies is not, at least in New York, a newfangled kind of
interference with legitimate business, but a thirty-year old
system which has dealt with tens of thousands of films, with
surprisingly little criticism, resistance or litigation.
In addition to the sincere and high-principled opponents of
State Censorship, there will always be, as there always have
been, the purveyors of filth for profit, and the latter make full
use of the arguments and protestations of the former. In the
end, does it not come down to a question, not of the constitutionality of forbidding the free expression of ideas, but
of whether government should have the power to keep plainly
obscene or immoral material from our people?
And here again we must avoid a detour. That all men, and
all courts, do not agree on detailed lists of what is "obscene"
or what is "immoral" does not deprive those words of meaning and application. "Obscene," for instance, is a good old
common law word, with centuries of usage behind it.16 Also,
it is a sufficiently descriptive word commonly employed and
readily understandable by ordinary people. So far as we can
discover, "obscene," though widely used in statutes, has not
been held lacking in the necessary specificity. "Obscene"
means, generally, matter which, taken as a whole, and considering the public to which it is addressed (and its general
motif) has a lewd and lascivious tendency, calculated to
16 Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 98 Eng. Rep. 327 (K.B. 1770); Commonwealth
v. Sharpless, 2 S. & R. 91, 102-3 (Pa. 1815); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass.
(17 Tyng) 336 (1821); State v. Appling, 25 Mo. 315 (1857); United States v. Ben-

nett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, 1104-5 No. 14,871 (C.C.SJ).N.Y. 1879).
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excite lustful and lecherous desires, and thus corrupt and
debauch the mind and morals of those in whose hands it
might fall while being susceptible to such influences. Such is
the classic definition announced, in 1868, by Lord Chief
Justice Cockburn in Regina v. Hicklin,T applying The Obscene Publications Act of 1857 "8to a publication with the
suggestive title The Confessional Unmasked. Despite recurring criticism, there is little doubt that it is the controlling
definition in American courts today. 9 That meaning may, of
course, be enlarged or circumscribed by statute, but standing
alone the word carries that meaning, historically and traditionally. That men may differ as to its specific applications
does not destroy it as a standard. Government puts the duty
of application on its officers, judges and juries. If words of
general import ("due care," "due process," "reasonable,"
""fraudulent," etc.) could not be so made use of, government
by law, as we know it, would come to an end, and ukases, individual decrees, and special instances would be substituted.
The use in statutes of more or less general terms, applied
administratively by legislatively-appointed or elected officials, but subject to court review, is of the essence of the
American system.
Another sort of argument runs against the use, as employed
in several state censorship statutes," of the word "immoral"
(or its antonym "moral"). Such a word, say our modernists,
L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868).
18 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83, § 1.
19 Swearingen v. United States, 161 U.S. 446, 451 (1896); Rosen v. United
States, 161 U.S. 29, 43 (1896) ; United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d
705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934) ; United States v. Dennett, 39 F.(2d) 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1930) ;
King V. Commonwealth, 313 Ky. 741, 233 S.W.2d 522, 524 (1950); Commonwealth
v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472, 473 (1930) ; Commonwealth v. Buckley, 200
Mass. 346, 86 N.E. 910, 911 (1909) ; St. Louis v. King, 226 Mo. 334, 126 S.W. 495,
498 (1910) ; People v. Wendling, 258 N.Y. 451, 453, 180 N.E. 169 (1932) ; People v.
Muller, 96 N.Y. 408, 411 (1884) ; People v. Larsen, 5 N.Y.2d 55, 56 (Bronx County
Ct. Spec. Sess. 1938).
20 KAN. GEN. STAT. § 51-103 (1949); MD. Awr. CODE Gss. LAWS art. 66A, § 6
(1951); MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 272, § 232 (1933); N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 1082, 1083;
Onio Gmsr. CODE A.N. § 154-47(b) (1938); PA. STAT. Am. tit. 4, §§ 43, 49 (1938);
17

VA. CODE

§ 2-105

(1950).
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means nothing at all, since - and here is the starting point
of our differences - it finds meaning only subjectively in the
mind of its user, and its application will vary accordingly.
Now we are back to fundamentals. We think that "immoral"
means contra bonos mores, that is, contrary to the generally
accepted civilized code of conduct for human behavior, and
the "moral sense of the community." 21 The cases" show that
this has been taken as its meaning in censorship statutes. The
United States Supreme Court itself, in its 1915 Mutual Film
decision, said that the word "moral" in the Ohio licensing law
there under attack, was not too indefinite, or of too variant
meaning, for use as a standard, and there seems to be no
decision the other way. The trouble is not that the word
"immoral" is too indefinite, but that it has been robbed of
meaning by those who deny that there is any such thing as a
changeless code of morals. Of course, this is not the time or
place to hold that particular debate. Two court decisions,
with eighty-five years between them, will serve present purposes to show that there is such a changeless code. In 1867,
the Court of Appeals of New York declared that, "Sound
morals, as taught by the wise men of antiquity, as confirmed
by the precepts of the gospel . .. are unchangeable." 2 In

1952 the Supreme Court wrote that, "We are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."' 24
The second of these quotations gives the reason why we
adhere to the first, and why "immoral" is an acceptable
standard.
The censorship we are talking about here is quite different
from, and must be carefully distinguished from, that attempt21 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341-3 (1890); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S.
14, 45 (1885) ; Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343, 349-50 (N.Y. 1820).
22 United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love," 48 F.(2d) 821,
823 (S.D. N.Y. 1931); Block v. Chicago, 239 Il. 251, 264, 87 N.E. 1011, 1015-16
(1909); People v. Dever, 242 Ill. App. 1, 4 (1926); Schuman v. Pickert, 277 Mich.
225, 229, 269 N.W. 152, 154 (1936).
23 Lyon v. Mitchell, 36 N.Y. 235, 238 (1867).
24 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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ed, as to newspapers and other periodicals, in Minnesota;
and condemned by the Supreme Court in the case of Near v.
Minnesota.25 That Minnesota enactment dubbed as a "nuisance" the circulation of an obscene or defamatory newspaper,
and authorized the Minnesota courts to "abate" such "nuisances." In the Near case, that statute and theory, resulted in
a judgment forbidding the further publication or distribution
of The Saturday Press, the offending paper. In other words,
the defaming of public officials resulted in putting the newspaper out of business. This was censorship with a vengeance
and exactly the kind of suppression of criticism that the First
Amendment was, in historical fact, directed against.2" As
Chief Justice Hughes remarked, it was a revival after a century and a half "of attempts to impose previous restraints
upon publications relating to the malfeasance of public officers .... ,,27

The difference between that kind of restraint and suppression, and the state motion picture censorship laws now in
effect, are numerous and obvious. Motion pictures (always
excepting newsreels and "documentary" films) are essentially
fictional in content, not normally used for criticizing or exposing public men or their acts or omissions. Next, and more
important as a distinction, movie censorship laws, unlike the
Minnesota statute in the Near case, do not put a producer out
of business, or put his future productions on an Index Expurgatorius. Films are inspected, and licensed or denied licenses,
one by one (actually, outright denials are few, deletions much
more common). The state does not deal out the awful penalty
of total outlawry of the business itself - it deals with one
offending film at a time. Finally, the film censorship statutes
do not, as did the extraordinary Minnesota law, deny licenses
because of "defamation" of public officials, but because their
25 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
26 Id. at 713-19 (1931). See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
27

Id. at 718.
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obscenity or immorality is such that they will do harm to
susceptible individuals, under ancient common law obscenity
concepts.
It all comes down to questions of public order and decency,
and of the power of democratic governments to protect order
and decency from the harm done by greedy men. The industry's own use of a "Code" testifies to the need for such
activity. Granted that such a power must be somewhere,
equally with the power to prevent the sale of poisonous food
or harmful drugs, we come to a question of method - of finding an efficient way of producing the proper and necessary
result without infringement of basic rights, that is, censorship on principle, not whim. If censorship can be so carried
on, there would seem to be no reason for wiping it out,
especially on specious notions that all prior restraints are
necessarily unconstitutional. Even in Kunz v. New York 28
(cited in the Supreme Court's Burstyn opinion) where New
York City police officials were denied the right to suppress
future public appearances of a street preacher who had insulted certain religions in his earlier sermons, the Supreme
Court at least intimated that the license could legally have
been refused, had the City ordinance expressed definite standards.
Censorship is unpopular, and understandably so. The right
of free expression is a cherished one, high up in American
public esteem. The use of any kind of police power to bar
entrance to the arena of free discussion is not the preferred
way to stop abuses. It can lead to thought control and destruction of basic freedoms. But, sadly, there are and always
will be abuses and abusers in our imperfect world. .In a perfect world of perfect men there would be no commercialized
obscenity nor pornography nor indecency, any more than
there would be adulterated food, or illicit sales of drugs. Free28 340 U.S. 290, 294-5 (1951). See also concurring opinion of Frankfurter in
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 285 (1951).
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dom of expression has duties as well as rights, and when those
duties are violated, in -a real and substantial way so as to
outrage the basic moral code, government has, I think, the
constitutional as well as the moral right to stop the evil at its
source, and need not wait and punish after the harm has been
done.
CharlesS. Desmond*
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